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I. Introduction
Economic outcomes are often characterized by pervasive uncertainty. This is
particularly true when insurance markets and safety nets are incomplete, saving
opportunities are limited, and many individuals rely on risky entrepreneurial
activities to generate their incomes (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). Poverty, which
constitutes a possible outcome for many, has in turn profound impacts on the
quality of the lives people live. Recent studies have shown that low income cor-
relates with lower life satisfaction andwith a larger loss in well-being after shocks
in other domains of life (Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008; Kahneman andDeaton
2010). In developing countries, where poverty is widespread, the correlation
between economic outcomes and life satisfaction is even stronger (Howell and
Howell 2008).
In this study we investigate the relationship between the risk of income pov-
erty and life satisfaction (interpreted hereafter as “happiness”) and the link between
sensitivity to downward risks and decision-making.1 In particular, we tackle the
following two questions. Is there a connection between happiness and the riskThis paper uses data from the Ghana Urban Household Panel Survey (GUHPS), conducted by the
Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) as part of ongoing research into African labor mar-
kets funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Research Consortium on Ed-
ucational Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP), the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Gates Foundation. We
are grateful to Marcel Fafchamps, William Maloney, and Francis Teal for helpful comments and to
the participants to the CSAE Conference 2011, the IZA (Institute of Labor Economics)–World Bank
Conference 2011, and the Royal Economic Society (RES) Conference 2013.We are indebted toMoses
Awoonor-Williams, who coordinated the data collection, and to the enumerators of the CSAE team in
Ghana. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Researchers distinguish two components of happiness (Kahneman and Deaton 2010). The first com-
ponent is life satisfaction, the evaluation we make of our own life. The second component is emotional
well-being, or the tendency to experience positive or negative affect. In this paper we analyze responses
from a survey question on life satisfaction, and hence we focus the analysis on the first component.
Throughout the text, we use the terms “happiness” and “life satisfaction” interchangeably.
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2 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eof poverty? And how are people’s decisions affected by exposure to such risk?2
While the connection between life satisfaction and low income has been heavily
researched, the one between life satisfaction and the risk of income poverty is
still unexplored. This is partly due to the challenges of estimating the probabil-
ity distribution of income convincingly. At the same time, it appears to be a very
important area of research, especially in developing countries, where widespread
exposure to uninsured shocks makes the risk of future income poverty pervasive
for both poor and nonpoor households.3 Evidence is also missing on the con-
nection between the determinants of happiness and those of decision-making:
are the same individuals whose happiness is sensitive to downside risk loss averse
in economic decisions? Vulnerabilitymay affect individual behavior in ways that
are detrimental to economic efficiency.4 Such evidence is thus a necessary first
step toward a full assessment of the welfare effects of economic vulnerability.
The context of our analysis is the urban labor market in Ghana, a growing
African country. Ghana is an interesting setting for our analysis, as the country
experienced substantial poverty reduction in recent years (Nsowah-Nuamah,
Teal, and Awoonor-Williams 2010) while, as our results suggest, large numbers
are still exposed to a significant risk of poverty. Given the novelty of the ques-
tion and of the testing strategy, our results provide leads that may prove relevant
in other contexts as well.
Our estimate of the risk of poverty builds upon work by Chaudhuri (2003)
and Chaudhuri, Jalan, and Suryahadi (2002), who propose two indexes of vul-
nerability to poverty that are amenable to empirical estimation based on panel
and cross-sectional variation, respectively.5 Using data from the Ghana Urban
Household Panel Survey, a long panel data set gathered by the Centre for the
Study of African Economies (CSAE) in urbanGhana, we obtain estimates of the2 We choose to focus on income, rather than consumption, for two main reasons. First, we aim to
link directly to the existing literature on subjective well-being, which has widely explored the rela-
tionship between happiness and income. Second, in urban contexts like the one we are studying, la-
bor earnings are typically the main source of income (for this reason, throughout the article the words
“income” and “earnings” are used interchangeably), and earning shocks are directly transmitted to
consumption. Changes in income and consumption are hence likely to be tightly correlated. We fully
acknowledge the difficulties that arise from attempting to measure income precisely in a low-income
setting with widespread informality, such as Ghana, especially when self-employment is prominent.
Sec. II provides a detailed discussion of the methodological challenges involved.
3 For example, in a recent study of sevenWest African capitals, Bocquier, Nordman, and Vescovo (2010)
construct a multidimensional index of employment vulnerability and find that 85% of private-sector
workers are vulnerable on the basis of at least one criterion in 2002–3.
4 Throughout the analysis the term “vulnerability” is used to refer to the risk of falling below the in-
come poverty line.
5 The two indexes are reviewed in a survey article by Ligon and Schechter (2004), who compare the
performance of different vulnerability measures through Monte Carlo simulations.
Caria and Falco 3two indexes for a representative sample of working-age Ghanaian earners. We
focus more extensively on the panel measure, since it enables us to estimate
individual-specific vulnerability. We further rely on the longitudinal nature of
the data to investigate the relationships of interest, between the risk of income
poverty and life satisfaction. Improving upon most of the existing literature on
happiness in developing countries, we are able to control for individual fixed
effects in the happiness model, ruling out potential biases from unobserved per-
sonality traits. Previous studies have indeed highlighted the importance of un-
observed heterogeneity in happiness regressions (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
2004; Graham, Eggers, and Sukhtankar 2004; Powdthavee 2010).
Our main result is a strong negative relationship between vulnerability to in-
come poverty and workers’ happiness, over and above the positive income effect
commonly documented in the literature. It is both statistically significant and
economically meaningful. Reducing the risk of poverty by 20 percentage points
(which amounts to entirely offsetting the risk of poverty for the median worker
in our sample) has the same effect on well-being as increasing earnings by 50%.
When we bootstrap the estimation sequence to account for imprecision in the
measure of vulnerability, the results do not change. Upon testing for the role of
two-sided uncertainty, as opposed to downward income losses, we find that the
effect of downward vulnerability on happiness is more evident. These findings
become more compelling when we consider the extent of the vulnerability to
poverty we uncover. About 35% of all workers, and 15% of currently nonpoor
workers, face a risk of poverty of at least 50%. Vulnerability decreases the life
satisfaction of a large pool of individuals.
In addition, we analyze the choices of a subsample of respondents in a set of
behavioral games designed to elicit attitudes toward risky prospects. Our max-
imum likelihood estimates reveal that subjects are characterized, on average, by
a substantial degree of loss aversion. We are careful not to collapse the distinct
notions of experienced utility and decision utility (Kahneman,Wakker, and Sa-
rin 1997).6 Our findings from the behavioral experiment show that, besides
influencing subjective well-being, downside risk also has an appreciable impact
on economic decisions.
Our work relates to two different strands of the literature. First, we contrib-
ute to the study of downside risk in developing countries. This literature has
focused on measurement (Chaudhuri 2003; Ligon and Schechter 2004), the
persistence of downside shocks (Dercon 2004; Dercon, Hoddinott, and Wol-6 “Decision utility” refers to the weights that people assign to outcomes when making choices. “Ex-
perienced utility” refers to the quality of an experience. The life-satisfaction question we employ in
this analysis asks respondents to make an evaluation of the latter. The behavioral experiments allow us
to make inferences about the former.
4 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Edehanna 2005), and the strategies employed to minimize and cope with shocks
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Dercon 1996; Fafchamps 2003, 2009;
Dercon and Christiaensen 2007). Most importantly, our analysis contributes
to the growing literature on the determinants of happiness. A number of em-
pirical papers have documented a cross-sectional correlation between income
and happiness (Kahneman and Deaton 2010), which does not disappear once
individual fixed effects are accounted for (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004;
Powdthavee 2010). A separate concern has been that of adaptation: the happi-
ness effects of income gains seem transitory and tend to disappear once income
reference points have adjusted (Easterlin 2001; Frey and Stutzer 2002; Di Tella,
Haisken-De New, and MacCulloch 2007; Knight and Gunatilaka 2008). The
literature has also explored the effect of social comparisons onwell-being (Blanch-
flower andOswald 2002; Kingdon andKnight 2004; Luttmer 2005).Our con-
tribution is to highlight the fact that risk—in particular, the risk of poverty—is
a major negative determinant of life satisfaction. Moreover, we show that the
same people who manifest loss sensitivity in life evaluation make economic de-
cisions consistent with loss aversion.
The results of this analysis bear important policy implications that may gen-
eralize well beyond the African context. Our findings provide clear motivation
for policy interventions to reduce people’s exposure to (downside) risk. They
also suggest that non-Rawlsian models of growth, whereby “someone may be
left behind,”may fail to enhance general welfare despite rising average incomes,
if the risk of falling behind is sufficiently widespread. Finally, loss aversion mo-
tivates individuals to forgo economic opportunities that are profitable in expec-
tation but may involve outcomes below the reference point. A reduction in vul-
nerability may result in efficiency gains too.
The article is structured as follows. Section II introduces the data we use in
the analysis. Section III outlines the empirical strategy. First, it explains the
methodology to estimate income vulnerability; second, it outlines the happiness
model. Section IV presents and discusses the results. Section V concludes.
II. Data
Our analysis is based on data from the Ghana Urban Household Panel Survey
(GUHPS), which was conducted by the CSAE in the cities of Accra, Kumasi,
Takoradi, and Cape Coast starting in 2004.7 Respondents were drawn by strat-
ified random sampling of urban households from the Population and Housing
Census of 2000. The survey was designed to cover all household members of7 The first wave was collected between the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004, but for simplicity
we refer to it as 2004.
Caria and Falco 5working age at the time of the interview. This paper focuses on the period be-
tween 2004 and 2009, when the survey was repeated every year with the sole
exception of 2007.8 Panel data sets of this length are unusual in developing
countries and are particularly uncommon in Africa.9
A module on subjective well-being—designed in accordance with the exist-
ing literature—was added to the survey in 2005. Our analysis focuses on the
answers to the following two questions: (1) “All things considered, how satisfied
are youwith your life as a whole these days?” and (2) “All things considered, how
satisfied are you with your current work?” In both cases, the options given to re-
spondents were “1. Very Dissatisfied, 2. Dissatisfied, 3. Neither Satisfied Nor
Dissatisfied, 4. Satisfied, 5. Very Satisfied.” Figure 1 depicts the distribution of
answers. Responses appear to be skewed toward positive values. For our quan-
titative analysis, we attribute numerical values on a scale from 1 to 5 to these
answers, where 1 corresponds to “Very Dissatisfied” and 5 to “Very Satisfied.”
Despite early criticism of their ability to accurately capture well-being (e.g.,
Mullainathan and Bertrand 2001), these measures have been consistently used
throughout the literature. Moreover, psychologists have recently been able to
validate the use of these questions, by showing their correlation with other mea-
sures of well-being, such as smiling more frequently (Graham, Eggers, and
Sukhtankar 2004; Layard 2005; Oswald and Wu 2010).
A selection of key summary statistics for our sample of interest is presented in
table 1. The average worker is 35.3 years old and has 8 years of formal educa-
tion.Most of them are self-employed (largely in the informal sector), as is typical
in the labor markets of many developing countries.10 For the self-employed,8 Subsequent survey waves were unavailable to us at the time of writing. Moreover, extending the
analysis beyond 2009 would pose severe challenges due to a change in the survey question on life
satisfaction introduced in 2010.
9 The panel is unbalanced, but attrition is not an absorbing state, in the sense that respondents who are
not interviewed in a givenwave are kept in the sample and reinterviewed in subsequent years.Out of the
initial sample of respondents interviewed in 2004, over 92% were reinterviewed at least once in the
following years, and about 65%were observed in at least three waves. Random attrition would decrease
precision and pose a classical problem of attenuation bias in the happiness model. In this case, the large
effects we estimate would be a lower bound of the true impacts. On the other hand, if the people whose
happiness is least affected by the risk of poverty are most likely to drop out, our estimates may be biased
upward. As a robustness check, the analysis presented below has been repeated on the strictly balanced
sample of individuals who are interviewed in all waves, and we find that this does not affect the results.
The point estimates of the coefficients discussed below do not change substantially, despite a drop in
precision due to the fall in sample size. Previous studies on these data have found no evidence of selective
attrition biasing the results (see Falco et al. 2011, 2015).
10 The sample described in table 1 is confined to workers for whom self-reported subjective well-being
data are available. Furthermore, it includes only paid workers for whom income is observed and we are
therefore able to construct a measure of income vulnerability.
Figure 1. Distribution of life satisfaction across the population (top) and by level of income (employed people only;
bottom).
Caria and Falco 7income is calculated as revenue minus cost (i.e., profit).11 In low-income set-
tings, such as urban Ghana, it is difficult to obtain precise estimates of such
profit, and we are aware of the challenge. A number of published studies, how-
ever, have successfully relied on profit information fromGUHPS (see Falco and
Haywood 2016 and Falco et al. 2015 for the most recent examples). Moreover,
a study by Fafchamps et al. (2012) lends additional support to the data. They use
personal digital assistant (PDA) technology to cross-check profit figures in a
sample of microentrepreneurs in urbanGhana that is very similar to the GUHPS
sample. They find that only a small proportion of profit calculations are im-
precise.1211 Th
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Private-sector wage .265 .442
Public-sector wage .074 .262
Ln(employees) .133 .418
Ln(firmsize) .842 1.551
Years since started current job 10.625 9.888
Married .53 .499
Ethnicity:
Ga-Dangme .145 .352
Ewe .06 .237
Mole-Dagbani and Hausa .096 .295
Other ethnicity .112 .316e resulting profits are attributed to the owner of
ork in the business are categorized as paid or
e an income. This may lead to some imprecisio
ship in some cases. However, the fact that the
t 80%) does not employ any other person (incl
the potential magnitude of the problem relativ
lf/herself (i.e., hires no other workers), the val
ly, its log in the regressions below equals 0. The
ere might be additional reasons of concern be
, in the absence of accurate bookkeeping, micro
nd cost figures, which might equally affect stan
are unable to spot inconsistencies across revenu
s suffer from such problems, and the fact that
in several published studies lends credibilitythe business. The remai
unpaid family labor, de
n, as it may be difficult t
large majority of the sel
uding household memb
ely small. When a self-e
ue of the variable “empl
same approachwas follo
yond the precision of p
entrepreneurs may sim
dard (paper-based) and
e, costs, and profit figu
GUHPS data have alre
to our analysis.Note. Restricted to observations in the happiness model, pooling survey waves. There were
740 observations, of which 738 include ethnic origin.ning household members
pending on whether they
o clearly identify business
f-employed in our sample
ers, either paid or unpaid)
mployed person works by
oyees” is set to 1. Conse-
wed by Falco et al. (2011).
rofit calculations. For in-
ply recall the “wrong” rev-
PDA-based surveys if the
res. Most microenterprise
ady been successfully em-
8 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EIII. Empirical Methodology
A. Constructing an Indicator of Vulnerability to Income Poverty
This section outlines the methodology to construct the vulnerability indicators
used in the remainder of the analysis. For a detailed discussion of the relative
merits of different vulnerability indexes, the reader is referred to the survey pa-
per by Ligon and Schechter (2004). The analysis in this article draws on the two
measures proposed by Chaudhuri (2003) and Chaudhuri, Jalan, and Suryahadi
(2002). The former relies on time-series variation in individual earnings and suits
particularly well the characteristics of our data set, where subjective well-being
is recorded for the same individuals over a number of consecutive years (in ad-
dition to income and other worker characteristics from which we can model
vulnerability). The latter method attempts to model cross-sectional variation
in earnings and to infer from it the degree of individual vulnerability. Ligon
and Schechter (2004) compare the performance of these two (and several other)
vulnerability indexes via Monte Carlo simulations, and their conclusion is in
favor of the panel approach as the best-performing indicator of actual vulnera-
bility.13 In light of their findings and of the data at our disposal, our main focus
is on the panel method. The appendix (available online) presents alternative es-
timates based on the cross-sectional approach and offers insights on the differ-
ences between the two.
Following Chaudhuri (2003), the income vulnerability of a worker at time
t is defined as the probability that the worker’s income will fall below a certain
threshold z in the next period. This differs from a simple measure of volatility.
The distribution from which a given worker’s income is drawn can have very
large volatility, but if most of the variation occurs above the threshold z, this
worker has a low probability of earning less than z and hence has low vulner-
ability.
Let ni,t be the inverse of vulnerability, that is, i’s probability at t of earning
an income above z at t 1 1:
ni,t 5 Pr yi,t11 > zð Þ: (1)
When z is the poverty line, ni,t is the probability at t that household i will not
be income poor at t 1 1. Following standard Mincerian earnings analysis, we
assume that income is generated by the following process:13 This is a sensible conclusion, considering the likely presence of unobserved individual fixed effects
that cannot be controlled for in a cross-sectional model of earnings and could therefore mislead the
analysis of vulnerability. An interesting alley for future research would be to explore how the results of
this analysis would change upon use of other vulnerability measures, including Ligon and Shechter’s
own index of vulnerability (see Ligon and Schechter 2003).
Caria and Falco 9ln yi,tð Þ 5 dXi,t 1 hi 1 tt 1 ei,t , (2)
where Xi,t is a bundle of observable characteristics, hi is an individual unob-
servable fixed effect, tt captures time effects that are common across workers
(e.g., aggregate income growth factors and common shocks), and ei,t is a sto-
chastic component.
Second, we assume the variance of ei,t to be a function of worker and house-
hold characteristics,
ln j2ln yi,t
 
5 vKi,t 1 yi, (3)
where yi is an individual fixed effect in the model of income variance and Ki,t
may or may not contain additional worker characteristics outside the set Xi,t.
In Chaudhuri (2003), Ki,t and Xi,t coincide.
The variance of the stochastic component can be modeled empirically with
the log of first-stage residuals from the earnings model:
ln e^2i,tð Þ 5 vKi,t 1 yi 1 qi,t , (4)
given that
1
T o
T
t51
e^2i,t→pj
2
ln yi,t : (5)
Assuming income to be (log)normally distributed and F to be the cumu-
lative distribution function of the lognormal distribution, we can now com-
pute the probability of not earning less than z at t 1 1 for every worker i
by using the following expression:
n^i,t 5 bPr ln yi,tð Þ > ln zð ÞjXi,t ,Ki,t , d^, v^  5 1 2 F ln zð Þ 2 m^i,t
j^i,t
 
, (6)
where m^i,t denotes the predicted value of (log) income and j^i;t the predicted
variance.14
This measure does not differentiate transitory from permanent shocks.When
saving, credit, and insurance options are limited, both transitory and permanent
shocks can have a significant impact on consumption. However, in the presence
of an effective saving technology, the two may have different impacts on welfare,14 The reader should note that, unlike the definition in eq. (1), our estimates of vulnerability are ob-
tained as the probability of falling below the poverty line, given worker characteristics at t, rather than
t 1 1. This choice was based on the idea that workers are most likely to assess their future prospects
on the basis of their current characteristics, some of which might themselves be stochastic and subject
to unpredictability.
10 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Esince transitory fluctuations can be smoothed out through precautionary savings.
We acknowledge that separating transitory and permanent shocks would be use-
ful, especially in the largest urban areas, where financial markets are likely to be
more accessible. Unfortunately, attempting to explicitly separate the permanent
from the transitory component of income variation (e.g., following the approach
by Meghir and Pistaferri 2004) would pose major challenges, given the length of
the panel at our disposal. This remains an open alley for future research.B. Empirical Model of Happiness
Having constructed a measure of income vulnerability, we can now explore its
relationship with subjective well-being. The following equation describes our
workhorse model of happiness:
hi,t 5 byi,t 1 gni,t 1 dZi,t 1 ki 1 εi,t , (7)
where hi,t is worker i’s level of life satisfaction in period t, yi,t is income at time t,
and ni,t is the inverse of vulnerability in the same period, Zi,t is a vector of worker
characteristics that are expected to be correlated with life satisfaction, and ki is
an unobserved happiness fixed effect that accounts for unobserved traits that
make an individual naturally more (or less) prone to be satisfied with his/her
life (e.g., optimism). Our main hypothesis is that b and g are positive (once
again, note that vi,t is the inverse of vulnerability and hence a “good” in this
specification): increasing income and decreasing vulnerability enhance life sat-
isfaction. In order to test it, we attempt to overcome several identification chal-
lenges.
First, a number of time-varying and time-invariant determinants of happi-
ness may be correlated with income and vulnerability. If omitted from the anal-
ysis, those variables may bias the results. Among the time-invariant factors, one
can think of personality traits and endowments of social and human capital
(which may have direct impacts on both job prospects and life satisfaction).
More extroverted and optimistic individuals, for instance, may be both “natu-
rally” satisfied with their life and more likely to find good, secure employment
or, equally plausibly, more willing to face the risks and uncertainty of entrepre-
neurship. The same may hold for educated or well-connected people. Among
the time-varying unobservables, working conditions are a first, obvious source
of bias. Powdthavee (2010) argues that income gains are often correlated with
deterioration in the conditions of work, and the latter may have an important
influence on life satisfaction. Vulnerability might also be correlated with work-
ing conditions, although we have no strong a priori evidence of the sign of such
correlation. Relative income is a third potentially confounding factor. Exten-
Caria and Falco 11sive empirical evidence has been generated showing that relative income is cor-
related with the life satisfaction of individuals in both developed and develop-
ing countries (Blanchflower and Oswald 2002; Kingdon and Knight 2004;
Luttmer 2005), and it is natural to assume that relative income will be corre-
lated with absolute income and vulnerability. We attempt to account for these
potential sources of bias by including in the model controls for working con-
ditions (proxied by a measure of satisfaction with work) and for a worker’s po-
sition in the income distribution. Most importantly, thanks to our panel data
set we are able to control for all time-invariant individual characteristics corre-
lated with happiness (e.g., personality traits).
The second challenge is methodological: life satisfaction is generally recorded
in data sets like GUHPS as a categorical variable. Modeling it as a discrete (or-
dered) outcome would, therefore, appear to be the most appropriate approach.
However, such an approach would not easily lend itself to controlling for those
time-invariant unobservables that we have argued are of great relevance in the
determination of life satisfaction. To address this issue, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Frijters (2004) develop a conditional estimator for the fixed-effects logit model.
Their findings show that “assuming ordinality or cardinality of happiness scores
makes little difference, while allowing for fixed-effects does change results sub-
stantially” (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004, 641).15 It therefore seems jus-
tifiable to assume cardinality of the life-satisfaction indicator and use the corre-
sponding estimators.
Third, issues of reverse causality may arise in the analysis. High levels of life
satisfaction may help individuals earn higher incomes or reduce their income
vulnerability (Graham, Eggers, and Sukhtankar 2004; De Neve and Oswald
2012). Such effects may again bias the estimated coefficients b and g. In order
to fully address this problem, we would be required to specify an FE-IV (fixed
effects–instrumental variable) regression approach. However, doubts are often
raised about the validity of the instruments proposed by authors who have at-
tempted the IV or FE-IV approach for income, such as Knight and Gunatilaka
(2008) and Powdthavee (2010).16 Hence, we do not attempt to instrument vul-
nerability, while fully acknowledging the possibility that these concerns might be
important.15 Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) base their analysis on data from the German Socio-economic
Panel. The life-satisfaction question in their data uses the same phrasing as that in GUHPS. The only
difference is that it is posed on a 1–10 scale, while in Ghana the scale is from 1 to 5. This should not
pose a challenge for comparability. The results reported in our paper confirm the main conclusion of
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) on the importance of controlling for individual fixed effects in
empirical models of life satisfaction.
16 Furthermore, the vulnerability variable has been constructed as a deterministic function of the pre-
dicted values of an earnings model, which would complicate an IV strategy.
12 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EFinally, the vulnerability index is a nonlinear function of the first two mo-
ments of the earnings distribution, which are both modeled as functions of
household and individual characteristics in the first stage of the estimation.
It follows that the happiness model (where we include both income and vulner-
ability on the right-hand side) contains two functions of those characteristics
among the regressors. Separate identification of these two functions implicitly
relies on assumptions regarding the relationship between income andwell-being.
Existing studies have often imposed linearity on the relationship, and, for com-
parability, we choose the same approach.17
IV. Results
We present here three sets of results. First, we discuss our estimates of income
vulnerability. Second, we present a number of regressions of happiness on vul-
nerability, which constitute the central results of our analysis. This section also
offers a test to distinguish between the effect of vulnerability and that of two-
sided uncertainty. Third, we show the results of a complementary analysis of
workers’ attitudes to gains and losses based on data from a field experiment.
A. Vulnerability Estimates
Table 2 shows the results from estimating the earnings and variance models
used to predict vulnerability later in the analysis. The first feature of the results
is that while the earnings model (col. 1) shows a relatively high predictive power,
trying to predict the variance of earnings proves to be a much more challenging
exercise (cols. 2–5).18
Upon experimenting with different earnings specifications, we concluded
that the best model is one that controls for individual fixed effects and for a
set of key time-varying covariates (col. 1), the choice of which is grounded
in a long-established literature on Mincerian earnings regressions (see Rankin,
Sandefur, and Teal 2010 for an application to Ghana using the GUHPS data
set). The results confirm a number of standard patterns observed in related
studies of earnings in sub-Saharan Africa. First, we find a statistically signifi-
cant effect of firm size on earnings (captured by positive coefficients on the log
of firm size for wage employees and on the log of the number of hired em-
ployees for the self-employed). Second, we detect a sizable civil-service premium
and a positive premium for longer tenure in the job. Third, while the linear effect17 Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008, 2009) report nonparametric results that show a linear relationship
between consumption expenditures and subjective satisfaction with consumption levels, lending em-
pirical support to this modeling choice.
18 This is to be expected, partly because a fraction of what appears to be true variation in earnings may
in fact be random measurement error.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATION OF VULNERABILITY
Dependent Variable
y
(1)
j2(K )
(2)
j2(X )
(3)
j2(X2 )
(4)
j2(X, FE )
(5)
Age .035 .019 2.0005
(.028) (.026) (.001)
Age2 2.0003 2.0004 2.0002 25.49E208 2.0005
(.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (4.76E208) (.001)
Education 2.028 2.055*
(.034) (.032)
Education2 .003 .004* 7.17E206
(.002) (.002) (8.15E206)
Male .134 .133 .127
(.095) (.092) (.092)
Private-sector wage 2.147** 2.991*** 2.944*** 2.967*** 2.234
(.074) (.149) (.145) (.121) (.177)
Public-sector wage .196* 21.342*** 21.319*** 21.313*** 2.120
(.112) (.184) (.180) (.177) (.269)
Ln(employees) .187*** .008 .040 .044 2.030
(.051) (.115) (.113) (.057) (.121)
Ln(firmsize) .055** .005 2.013 2.0003 .062
(.021) (.042) (.042) (.008) (.051)
Years since current-job start .005* .003 .004 .0002 .005
(.003) (.006) (.006) (.0002) (.007)
Married 2.052
(.095)
Ethnicity:
Ga-Dangme 2.037
(.119)
Ewe .392**
(.171)
Mole-Dagbani and Hausa .578***
(.155)
Other 2.181
(.162)
Constant 2.588* 23.041*** 22.642*** 22.514*** 23.293**
(1.346) (.519) (.491) (.190) (1.294)
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observationsa 3,659 3,014 3,110 3,110 3,110
R 2 .685 .073 .065 .064 .627Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. y 5 log(real monthly earnings); j 2(K ) 5 log(variance of
y) modeled as a function of K; j 2(X )5 log(variance of y) modeled as a function of X; j 2(X 2)5 log(variance
of y) modeled as a function of X 2; j 2(X, FE) 5 log(variance of y) modeled as a function of X including in-
dividual fixed effects (this specification is used to compute vulnerability subsequently in the paper). X is the
set of key regressors in the income model, K is an augmented set of regressors to include potential deter-
minants of the variance. The omitted occupational category is “self-employed”; the omitted ethnicity is
Akan. “Public-sector wage” includes all salaried workers in the public sector, including civil servants and
workers in public enterprises.
a N  T; columns 2–5 have fewer observations than column 1 because the variance analysis must be con-
fined to respondents who appear multiple times in the panel. Column 2 has fewer observations than col-
umns 3–5 because of missing values in the marriage and ethnicity variables.
* Confidence: 90%.
** Confidence: 95%.
*** Confidence: 99%.
14 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eof age cannot be estimated when time trends are also controlled for, we find
some indication of the typical concavity of the age-earnings profile (though
the coefficient on age squared is not statistically significant). Since the estima-
tion in column 1 is carried out with controls for individual fixed effects, it is
not possible to separately identify the coefficients on time-invariant character-
istics such as education and gender.
We estimate several variance models.We first estimate a model with the same
covariates used in the earnings regression and no fixed effects. This model is able
to explain only a small portion of the variation in the data. We then estimate a
model that includes additional covariates that were not part of the earningsmodel.
Motivated by the observation that social networks can provide an important
buffer against negative income shocks, such additional variables include the re-
spondent’s ethnic background andmarital status. This strategy allows us to mar-
ginally increase the fit of the model but requires us to make the assumption that
ethnicity and marital status determine only the variance of income and not its
mean. Our preferred model is thus the model reported in column 5, where
we include the same covariates used in the earnings regression as well as allow
for individual fixed effects to determine the variance of income.19 This strategy
is close to the one employed in Chaudhuri (2003), and the measure of vulner-
ability used in the rest of the paper is based on this method.
Given our estimates of the earnings model, before we can calculate vulner-
ability we need to define a low-earnings threshold (alternatively referred to as
the “poverty line”), z. Figure 2 shows the percentage of people who are below
different income thresholds, while figure 3 shows the resulting cumulative dis-
tribution of the vulnerability index. Our choice for the remainder of the paper
is to set z 5 10 Ghana cedis per month, which approximately translates into
US$40.20 When we experimented with alternative lines in the vicinity of this
value, the main patterns in our results did not change.21 For z 5 US$40, the19 Ethnicity does not vary over time, and we also have very little variation in marital status. This gives
us a second reason to omit ethnicity and marital status in the variance model with fixed effects.
20 All income figures have been deflated, and the entire analysis is conducted at constant prices with
1997 as the base year. The reader should be alert to the fact that in 2007 the Ghana cedi was con-
verted into the new Ghana cedi at a rate of 10,000 Ghana cedis to 1 new Ghana cedi. For simplicity,
all the income figures used in the analysis have been converted into new Ghana cedis. The exchange
rate with the US dollar is not adjusted for purchasing-power parity (PPP).
21 The poverty line we have chosen (10 Ghana cedis per month) translates into nearly US$170, ad-
justed for PPP. Assuming that the typical earner in our sample sustains a family of five people with
one additional adult (older than 14) and three children (or alternatively, a family of four with two
additional adults and one child, based on a standard equivalence scale), this translates into about
$1.70 per capita a day, which is close to standard definitions of poverty. This figure is also consistent
with the responses to a question added to GUHPS in 2009, which asked respondents to report the
income level they deemed sufficient to cater to (1) basic needs and (2) a comfortable life. We interpret
Caria and Falco 15risk of poverty we estimate is substantial for large portions of our sample. The
central line in figure 3 shows that, on average, 35% of workers in a given year
have a chance of 50% or more of being poor in the next period. When we dis-
aggregate the estimation between currently poor and nonpoor workers (fig. 4),
we find that even among the latter a sizable group faces a large probability of
becoming poor.
B. Happiness
This section presents the results from estimating our happiness model. Figure 1
(bottom) plots the histogram of happiness responses after the sample was split
by low/high income relative to the poverty line. The histogram shows prima fa-
cie evidence of the link between income and happiness that we are attemptingFigure 2. Percentage of employed with income below the low-earnings threshold (y < z). GHC 5 Ghana cedis;
USD 5 US dollars.the answers as a direct, albeit crude, measure of workers’ reference points, and variation below the
reference point can be considered as downside risk. Upon plotting those answers (available upon re-
quest), we found that for the vast majority of the sample (more than 90%), our chosen poverty
threshold lies below both measures of minimum desirable income. This lends strong support to
the assertion that our low-income range is within the domain of poverty as perceived by urban
Ghanaians. Nonetheless, we are aware that, while we have good reasons to set the poverty line at
10 Ghana cedis per month, other thresholds could be used. We thus experimented with poverty lines
that range from about one-third to about three times our preferred value and found no major changes
in our main results.
Figure 3. Cumulative distribution of vulnerability for different poverty lines (zt). GHC 5 Ghana cedis; USD 5
US dollars.Figure 4. Cumulative distribution of vulnerability by current poverty status; zt 5 10 (1997) Ghana cedis.
Caria and Falco 17to formally test, with people who are above the low-income threshold more
likely to report being “satisfied” with their life.
Table 3 reports the results from estimating the workhorse model of happi-
ness (eq. [7]), first using ordinary least squares (OLS; cols. 1–2) and then con-
trolling for fixed effects (cols. 3–4). Our first result is a positive and significant
effect of absolute income on life satisfaction, in line with the existing literature
(e.g., De Neve and Cooper 1998). This relationship is evident in the OLS re-
gressions, and, rather strikingly, it does not change significantly once we con-
trol for fixed effects. It appears, therefore, that time-invariant unobservables
correlated with earnings are not biasing the estimated effect of income on hap-
piness. Interestingly, the size of the estimated coefficient on the log of income
in column 3, 0.017, is remarkably close to that estimated by Powdthavee (2010),
using data from the British Households Panel Survey and a fixed-effect estima-
tor, 0.019.TABLE 3
HAPPINESS AND VULNERABILITY
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1 2 Vul) 2.006 .005 .087** .117***
(.017) (.018) (.036) (.044)
LnRealEarn .013** .033*** .017** .051***
(.006) (.012) (.008) (.017)
LnWorkSatis .618*** .615*** .588*** .587***
(.014) (.014) (.025) (.025)
Married .027** .023
(.010) (.020)
Age 2.006* 2.019
(.003) (.014)
Age2 .00007* .0002
(.00004) (.0002)
EarnQuart 5 2 2.0009 2.026
(.018) (.025)
EarnQuart 5 3 2.048** 2.069**
(.023) (.034)
EarnQuart 5 4 2.060* 2.099**
(.032) (.048)
Constant .426*** .489*** .388*** .784***
(.019) (.059) (.036) (.273)
Observationsa 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507
R 2 .45 .454 .422 .425Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. EarnQuart 5 earnings quartile.
a N T. The number of observations is lower than that in the earnings model in table 2 because of missing
values in the life-satisfaction variable (most notably due to the fact that there was no question on life sat-
isfaction in the very first wave of GUHPS [2004]). We keep 2004 data in the earnings regressions to ensure
we model the earnings process as precisely as possible.
* Confidence: 90%.
** Confidence: 95%.
*** Confidence: 99%.
18 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EOn the other hand, table 3 shows that individual fixed effects play an impor-
tant role in the relationship between vulnerability and life satisfaction. Once
we control for them, we find a strong negative relationship between vulnera-
bility and happiness, over and above the income effect just described (recall
that in the regression tables this is reported as a positive relationship between
the inverse of vulnerability and happiness). This is the key result in the paper. It
is both statistically significant and economically meaningful. Reducing the risk
of poverty by 20 percentage points (which amounts to entirely offsetting the
risk of poverty for the median worker in our sample) has the same effect on
well-being as increasing earnings by 50%.
The change in the coefficient on the inverse of vulnerability, which we ob-
tain upon controlling for fixed effects, is an indication that individuals who
tend to be more satisfied with their lives (high ki) face more downside risk.22
This could be the case if a common personality trait determines life satisfaction
as well as occupational choice. For example, individuals who value autonomy
may be happier as well as more likely towork in sectors such as self-employment,
where autonomy comes at the cost of a higher risk of low earnings (Benz and
Frey 2008; Falco et al. 2015). We investigate this hypothesis by computing
the correlation between the estimated fixed effects from the happiness model
in equation (7) and the probability of being self-employed (which in Ghana,
as shown by Falco 2014, is associated with higher earnings risk than salaried
work). Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a positive and highly significant
correlation (not shown for conciseness).
Our estimation also includes controls for work satisfaction (proxying changes
in working conditions), earnings quartile, age and its square, and marital status.
Work satisfaction is closely correlated with life satisfaction and shows by far the
biggest positive coefficient in the life-satisfaction regression.23 The earnings quar-
tile dummies allow us to control for the position of respondents in the income
distribution, which has been shown to be a significant predictor of well-being
(Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008). Their inclusion in the regression model does
not affect our main results (if anything, the coefficient on vulnerability increases
slightly). This should reassure the reader that changes in relative income are not
confounding our estimates of the relationship between income vulnerability
and happiness.2422 The fixed effects appear to correlate negatively with the “inverse” of vulnerability. Hence, they cor-
relate positively with downside risk.
23 As a robustness check, we tried to exclude work satisfaction from the estimation, and the results
did not change significantly (we detected only a slight increase in the effect of vulnerability).
24 In addition to what is reported in the table, we experimented with finer quantile disaggregation
(quintiles and deciles), and the main results did not change.
Caria and Falco 19Finally, the vulnerability index has been constructed with estimates from a
first-stage model of earnings. Hence, it carries a degree of statistical imprecision
that could pose a challenge to the significance of our estimates in the second-
stage model of happiness. In order to check the robustness of our results to such
a concern, we bootstrap the entire estimation sequence (including the first
stage to construct the vulnerability index), sampling with replacement to ob-
tain 200 replications of the original sample. The results are summarized in fig-
ures 5 and 6, where we plot the distribution of the bootstrapped coefficients
on earnings and on the inverse of vulnerability (from the happiness model),
and they are consistent with the discussion so far.
C. Alternative Explanations
The measure of vulnerability employed in this paper focuses on the notion of
exposure to downside risk, and we interpret our findings as showing that the
risk of income poverty has a significant impact on well-being. An alternative
explanation could be that individuals dislike income volatility per se (rather
than exposure to downside risk). In this section we attempt to disentangle the
two hypotheses by replacing the vulnerabilitymeasure used so far with two-sided
measures of earnings volatility.
First, we use the raw squared residual e^2i,t from a first-stage earnings regres-
sion with fixed effects as a proxy for income volatility and find no significantFigure 5. Bootstrapped distribution (200 samples) of the coefficient on LnRealEarn. The central vertical line on each
graph indicates the median, and the two outer vertical lines indicate the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution.
The dashed line represents a kernel density of the distribution.
20 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Erelationship with happiness (table 4), despite the sign of the estimated effect
always being negative (as we would expect if workers are risk averse).25 The
lack of statistical significance might be due to the fact that ex post realizations
of the shock are a noisy proxy of the expected degree of vulnerability workers
perceive (and are affected by). A way to circumvent the problem is to model
the variance of these residuals, as we did in Section III.A, and use the predicted
value as a measure of expected variance. Upon doing that, we document once
again a negative effect of volatility on life satisfaction that is not statistically
significant (the results are not reported for conciseness but are available upon
request). Overall, this evidence points to the conclusion that vulnerability to
downside income risk, as analyzed in the previous section, plays a more clear-
cut role in the determination of well-being than two-sided volatility.
D. Choice among Risky Prospects
Our final piece of evidence comes from a behavioral experiment that studies
individual choices between risky prospects when downside risk is present and
when it is absent. Our objective is to investigate whether downside risk affects
the economic decisions of the respondents in our sample. We do so by esti-
mating the level of loss aversion implied by the respondents’ choices in a seriesFigure 6. Bootstrapped distribution (200 samples) of the coefficient on (1 2 Vul). The central vertical line on each
graph indicates the median, and the two outer vertical lines indicate the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution.
The dashed line represents a kernel density of the distribution.25 Using experimental data, Falco (2014) shows that the majority of GUHPS respondents are indeed
risk averse.
Caria and Falco 21of lottery games. This complements our analysis of life satisfaction and high-
lights the role of downside risk in the domain of decision-making (Kahneman,
Wakker, and Sarin 1997).
The experiment, extensively described in Falco (2014), was run in 2007, with
a random subsample of 307 GUHPS respondents. It consisted of 21 choices
between pairs of monetary lotteries. Each “game” was framed as a choice be-
tween two opaque urns containing marbles of different colors and, corre-
spondingly, different monetary values.26 After being shown the composition
of each urn, respondents were asked to choose the one from which they would
prefer to draw a marble. Before making their choices, they were informed that
at the end of the game one of their 21 preferred lotteries would be randomly
selected and played out. The winnings of that game would then be paid to
the respondent. Monetary incentives of this kind are used to induce truthful
revelation of preferences.TABLE 4
VULNERABLE TO DOWNSIDE RISK OR AVERSE TO UNCERTAINTY? (RESIDUAL)
OLS1
(1)
OLS2
(2)
FE1
(3)
FE2
(4)
e^2ln y 2.003 2.004 2.009 2.011
(.007) (.007) (.010) (.010)
LnRealEarn .012** .034*** .021*** .051***
(.005) (.011) (.008) (.017)
LnWorkSatis .618*** .615*** .588*** .588***
(.014) (.014) (.025) (.025)
Married .027** .018
(.010) (.020)
Age 2.006* 2.007
(.003) (.013)
Age2 .00007* .0001
(.00004) (.0002)
EarnQuart 5 2 2.003 2.027
(.018) (.026)
EarnQuart 5 3 2.050** 2.068*
(.023) (.035)
EarnQuart 5 4 2.061* 2.096
(.032) (.049)**
Constant .428*** .487*** .438*** .524**
(.019) (.059) (.031) (.247)
Observations (N  T ) 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507
R 2 .45 .454 .42 .42326 Barr (2007) has a detailed description of the experimental setup.Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS 5 ordinary least squares; FE 5 fixed effects;
EarnQuart 5 earnings quartile.
* Confidence: 90%.
** Confidence: 95%.
*** Confidence: 99%.
22 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EChoices were framed in terms of losses and gains with respect to the refer-
ence point of no gain over the initial endowment. This standard manipulation
is ubiquitous in the experimental literature on loss aversion.
Using data from the experiment, we perform amaximum likelihood estima-
tion of the following utility function, which incorporates a loss-aversion pa-
rameter, l:27
u xð Þ 5
xa  if x ≥ 0,
2l 2xb
 
 if x < 0:
(
(8)
This is a standard parameterization of utility functions in the prospect-theory
literature (Wakker 2010). An estimate ofl greater than 1 is evidence of loss aver-
sion: losses are felt more than gains. In line with prospect theory, we further as-
sume that prospects are evaluated as a weighted sum of the utilities of the various
outcomes, where the weights are transformations of the actual probabilities given
by the following probability-weighting function:
q pð Þ 5
pg
pg 1 1 2 pð Þg½ 1=g  if x ≥ 0,
pf
pf 1 1 2 pð Þf 1=f  if x < 0:
8>><>>: (9)
Given these assumptions about the form of the utility function and the
weighting of probabilities, we can calculate the difference in utility between
the two lotteries in each pair. For each of the two lotteries R and L we obtain
∇PU 5 oRq pRð Þu xRð Þ 2oLq pLð Þu xLð Þ
m
, (10)
where ∇PU includes an error term capturing the possibility that individuals
make mistakes when assessing the utility they would derive from a lottery. We
model this error term following the recommendations of the literature (Hey
and Orme 1994; Andersen et al. 2010). The choice of a lottery is then modeled
as a stochastic function of ∇PU. The log-likelihood is hence given by
ln L a, b, l, g, f, m; y, Xð Þ
5 o
i
ln F ∇PUð Þjyi 5 Rð Þ 1 lnF 1 2 ∇PUð Þjyi 5 Lð Þ½ :
(11)27 Following prospect theory, this utility function has separate parameters to define the curvature in
the loss and gain domains. We assume that the reference point is 0 and define x as the gain over the
initial endowment. This is consistent with the framing of the lotteries.
Caria and Falco 23Details on the estimation procedure are further outlined in Harrison (2008) and
Falco (2014).
We first estimate the parameters of utility function (8), pooling the choices
of all respondents. We cluster standard errors at the individual level, as recom-
mended by Andersen et al. (2010). The estimate of loss aversion we obtain is
1.77 (table 5), which is in line with previous experimental findings (Booij,
Praag, and Kuilen 2010; Wakker 2010). Using a standard test, we can reject
the null of l 5 1 at a 1% significance level.
Furthermore, we attempt to estimate a coefficient of loss aversion for each in-
dividual in the sample. Our maximum likelihood routine converges for 266 re-
spondents. However, for 45 of them we obtain estimates of l above 10, which
are inconsistent with the upper bounds reported in other studies (Booij, Praag,
and Kuilen 2010;Wakker 2010).We exclude these from the analysis. Out of the
remaining observations, we estimate l above 1, indicating loss aversion, for 55%
of individuals. The precision of these individual estimates is, however, low, so
we are able to reject the null hypothesis of l 5 1 for only 22% of the respon-
dents. Figure 7 shows the distribution of estimated loss-aversion coefficients.TABLE 5
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF UTILITY FUNCTION (8)
Parameter Estimate Robust Standard Error z p > FzF
a .42 .017 24.24 .00
b 1.90 .074 25.77 .00
l 1.77 .169 10.45 .00Figure 7. Distribution of loss-aversion coefficients l; Epanechikov kernel; bandwidth 5 0.4553.
24 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EOverall, the results in this section complement the discussion above by show-
ing that the workers in our sample are characterized by significant loss aversion,
and therefore that downside risk will affect not only their well-being but also
their decisions. Thus, labor markets that expose workers to large downside risks
not only harm workers’ welfare but may also lead people to forgo profitable (but
risky) investment opportunities (Blumberg and Kremer 2014).
An interesting extension of the analysis would be to investigate whether
individuals with higher loss aversion experience higher losses in well-being
as a result of vulnerability. While it is possible, this may not necessarily be
the case, since loss aversion describes the weight that people give to outcomes
below a reference point when making decisions, and this “decision utility”
may not correlate perfectly with “experienced utility” (Kahneman, Wakker,
and Sarin 1997). However, as the individual estimates of loss aversion are
rather noisy, we are not in a position to convincingly investigate in our data
whether income vulnerability causes larger well-being costs for loss-averse in-
dividuals.28
V. Conclusions
This article investigates the relationship between income and well-being in a
growing developing country, with a focus on the previously unexplored link
between the risk of income poverty and happiness. Using unique longitudinal
data from a representative household survey from urban Ghana, we are able to
measure the probability of income poverty at the individual level and explore
its relationship with life satisfaction. Our results are compelling.
First, our analysis reveals a substantial risk of poverty for a large share of the
population. Second, we find a strong negative relationship between vulnera-
bility to poverty and life satisfaction, over and above the positive income effect
commonly documented in the literature. The result is both statistically signif-
icant and economically meaningful. Reducing vulnerability by 20 percentage
points has the same effect on well-being as increasing income by 50%. Inter-
estingly, we find that failing to control for individual fixed effects leads to sig-
nificant bias and misleading conclusions. Further, we attempt to disentangle28 There is a second reason not to attempt this analysis. In the experiment we measure loss aversion
with respect to a reference point created by a fixed endowment, which represents the “status quo”
before the decision. This is standard practice in the literature that studies loss aversion. In the pre-
vious sections, on the other hand, we have studied the risk of falling below a poverty line. The poverty
line will differ from the status quo for many individuals. Thus, while we study attitudes toward
downside risk in both cases, the two measures we use define “downside risk” differently. In general,
the literature on loss aversion has not yet fully understood how individuals choose reference points,
and we flag this as an area for future research (Kőszegi and Rabin 2006). We thank an anonymous
reviewer for raising this point.
Caria and Falco 25the effect of downside risk on happiness from the effect of two-sided uncer-
tainty. We find that the former has the clearer impact on subjective well-being.
Finally, in a matched behavioral experiment that elicits respondents’ attitudes
toward risky prospects, we find evidence of significant levels of loss aversion
among our respondents. This suggests that the effect of downside risk is not
limited to life evaluation but extends to decision making.
Our results highlight the importance of social protection as an instrument
to shield workers from the risk of falling into poverty. Loss-averse agents will
be more willing to undertake productive investments when safety nets and in-
surance minimize this risk. Importantly, our evidence suggests that these pol-
icies will directly improve life satisfaction and should be considered alongside
interventions that target other determinants of well-being, such as working
conditions and work-life balance. More broadly, our results suggest that the
well-being gains that developing countries can obtain by raising average in-
comes may be limited if the risk of falling into poverty remains high for a large
share of the population.
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